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Article Abstract 
Politics on the boundaries as a practice and third space of sovereignty as a 
pursuit frame a logic of indigenous politics developed through post-colonial 
analysis- The post-colonial premises of this logic are defined and applied in this 
article through an examination of indigenous political claims and activities from 
different historical moments. These forms of indigenous politics articulate di-
verse and yet similarly woven strands of the logic of politics on the boundaries. 
Implicated in any logic of indigenous politics in the U.S. context is the effort to 
affect a more politically resonant understanding of how American political iden-
tity has been constructed through a symbolic and material relationship to indig-
enous people. As such, this logic can and is turned around to shed light on the 
tensions inherent to American politics. Finally, the article closes by demonstrat-
ing how politics on the boundaries clarifies the terms of the pro-casino argu-
ments of California-based tribes during the Proposition 5 campaign in 1998. 
Introduction 
Recently, a number of indigenous tribes 1 in the United States have experi-
enced considerable economic success from owning and operating casinos. This 
material success has facilitated access to mainstream American politics via the 
old-fashioned way, campaign contributions to political parties and candidates. 
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The prime example of this phenomenon came in the 1998 California elections, 
where a record $90 million was spent on the Yes and No campaigns for Proposi-
tion 5, 2 an initiative placed on the ballot by a coalition of tribes to amend state 
law in order to legalize their casino operations. Proposition 5 passed by a wide 
margin of 63% to 37%. 3 This newfound power within American politics has 
provoked concern amongst some indigenous people about what this activity 
might mean for the future of indigenous political institutions and political cul-
ture. David Wilkins, a political scientist, legal scholar and member of the Lumbee 
Nation recently expressed his worry: "If tribal governments and their multilay-
ered citizens are so actively engaged in non-Indian politics, can tribes still legiti-
mately assert that they are in fact extraconstitutional sovereigns?" 4 Wilkins' no-
tion of "extraconstitutionality"5 underscores prevailing uncertainties over tribal 
status within the U.S. context, and thus over the practice and purpose of a spe-
cifically indigenous politics. 
One basis for these uncertainties stems from America's founding legal and 
political document, the U.S. Constitution. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 man-
dates that Congress shall have the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." This clause 
hints at the dilemma in trying to understand the legal and political location of 
indigenous tribes in relation to the U.S. polity. While the "several States" are 
inside and "foreign Nations" are outside American political boundaries, "Indian 
Tribes" are not wholly positioned in either the internal or external space. They 
constitute a unique location not quite but somewhat like that of the other two 
political entities, confounding efforts to grasp indigenous people's politics in 
the American political context, especially concerning the issue of sovereignty. 
Over time, the notion of what sovereignty means for the United States and 
what it means for indigenous tribes have changed in relation to each other. One 
way to describe this change is to note that, upon its founding in the eighteenth 
century, the U.S. negotiated and fought "with" indigenous tribes as if they were 
foreign nations, but by the late twentieth century the U.S. legislated and ruled 
"over" indigenous tribes as if they were a domestic concern. 6 Historically, how-
ever, indigenous tribes in relation to the U.S. are neither solely foreign nor do-
mestic entities,7 but paradoxically both at the same time. Considering the consti-
tutional and historical ambiguity of indigenous political status, the politics of 
indigenous people appears to stem from a location on the boundaries separating 
the inside from the outside and/or the domestic from the international. This is 
what I call politics on the boundaries, a logic of indigenous political practice 
and purpose which this essay defines, illustrates and utilizes to shed light on 
indigenous people's political life. 
Politics on the boundaries means that indigenous political actors, in their 
words and deeds, work back and forth, inside and outside American politics and 
history to generate the greatest possible sovereignty for their tribes. On the in-
side to outside trajectory, they work within the boundaries of the U.S. political 
system, drawing on treaty promises, legislative commitments and American 
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political discourse, in order to enhance the sovereignty of their tribal govern-
ments. This trajectory is complimented by the outside to inside strategy, whereby 
indigenous actors emphasize external sovereignty—defined temporally, as in 
sovereignty held prior to and thus outside American political history and/or spa-
tially, as in sovereignty norms articulated outside the United States—to strengthen 
their position within the American political system. Politics on the boundaries 
as a practice, then, pursues a form of sovereignty that is neither complete seces-
sion from nor complete assimilation into the American polity. 
The effort to denaturalize boundaries 8 by showing them to be locations of 
political contest and claim-making is illuminated through a post-colonial theo-
retical perspective on the indigenous-American political relationship. Post-co-
lonial theory seeks to address the constitutional role that the colonizer and the 
colonized have had upon one another, historically, culturally and politically. In 
its unique contribution to political analysis, post-colonial theory does not tend 
to reflect the inadequacies of political science literature dealing with race and 
ethnicity generally, and indigenous people specifically. Political science, on the 
whole, 9 does not tend to account for the constitutional processes between group 
identities and the effect of this for their political relationship. Furthermore, po-
litical science all too often assumes that indigenous people are just another race 
or ethnicity, 1 0 rather than seeing indigenous groups as tribes and nations whose 
claims for sovereignty are a defining component of their identity. Working through 
a post-colonial analysis suggests the presence of a "third space" of sovereignty 
positioned on, rather than inside or outside of, political boundaries. Rather than 
presuming the coherence of the colonizer's identity and the fractured state of the 
colonized as the basis for analyzing this political relationship, a post-colonial 
third space acknowledges the fullness and complexity of indigenous people's 
political identity, claims and activities. 
Politics on the boundaries as a practice and third space of sovereignty as a 
pursuit frame a logic of indigenous politics developed through post-colonial 
analysis. After setting out this logic's post-colonial premises, this article exam-
ines historical examples of indigenous political claims and activities that dem-
onstrate the different yet linked strands of the logic of politics on the bound-
aries. American political identity is used to shed light on its construction. In 
conclusion, politics on the boundaries makes sense of the strategy behind the 
pro-casino arguments of California-based tribes in 1998. 
Post-Colonial Theory and the Supplemental Challenge 
Within post-colonial theory, many excellent works have analyzed the rela-
tionship between the colonizer and the colonized through fields such as litera-
ture, film and feminism. 1 1 However, this essay's theoretical premises are best 
framed through Homi Bhabha's analysis, in The Location of Culture, of the 
articulations of colonized peoples in contemporary political life as a "Third Space 
of enunciation, which makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambiva-
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lent process." 1 2 The ambivalence of meaning, reference and enunciation lies at 
the heart of the tensions defining the post-colonial condition and political iden-
tity of colonized peoples. 1 3 The political identity of the colonized, in this case 
U.S. located indigenous tribes, is premised upon and persistently forced to ad-
dress the apparent tension between past and present, tradition and change, and 
static and fluid identity. Indigenous people face these tensions explicitly and 
continuously, having to legitimize their historical relationship to territory and/or 
as a coherent group in the effort to gain from the U.S. Government, among other 
things, legal and political recognition as tribes and viable healings of their claims. 
That this ambivalence is inherent to the political culture and claim-making pro-
cess of indigenous people points to the value of expanding Bhabha's "third space 
of enunciation" from a way to understand political articulation into a form of 
political claim-making that acknowledges ambivalence in the meaning and prac-
tice of sovereignty, hence the "third space of sovereignty." A third space of sov-
ereignty emerges out of a politics on the boundaries that seeks to widen the 
vision of political discourse, with specific concern for contesting how a domi-
nant nation constructs the relationship between its political identity and its claim 
to authority over demarcated space. 
Politics on the boundaries offers what Bhabha might call a "supplementary 
strategy," in which the non-dominant group 
does not simply confront the . . . powerful master-discourse with a con-
tradictory or negating referent. It does not turn contradiction into dia-
lectical process. It interrogates its object by initially withholding its 
objective. Insinuating itself into the terms of reference of the dominant 
discourse, the supplementary antagonizes the implicit power to gener-
alize, to produce sociological solidity.1 4 
By re-defining the meaning of their location on the boundary, non-domi-
nant groups can resist the effort of the dominant group, be it a singularly defined 
nation or a multicultural diversity of liberals, to homogenize the discursive rela-
tionship of a people to a bounded political space. Claims to a third space of 
sovereignty refuse the notion that sovereignty had any simple definition and 
assert that no matter how it is defined sovereignty does not simply connect 
unhybridized identity to authority over bounded political space. Thus, a politics 
on the boundaries seeks to resignify state boundaries into the possible location 
of a form of sovereignty that does not conform to the seemingly unambiguous 
choices of the western state system: secession or political assimilation. 
With this in mind, we can re-read the earlier discussion of Article I, Section 
8 of the U.S. Constitution, mandating Congress' relationship to "foreign Na-
tions," "the several States," and "the Indian Tribes." The "several States" occupy 
the first space within the American polity, while "foreign Nations" occupy the 
second space on the outside. This leaves "Indian Tribes" to constitute their own 
third space in both political status and claims in relation to American political 
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institutions and political culture. Setting forth a post-colonial framework in which 
a third space of sovereignty offers a way to re-conceive contemporary political 
relations leads us to look at how indigenous and non-indigenous political iden-
tities are constructed and located relative to the meaning and practice of sover-
eignty. This is because indigenous political voices seek to open for interrogation 
the political identity of the dominant nation regarding the presumptive legiti-
macy of its sovereignty over bounded political space. 
Indigenous Articulations: Across Political Time and Space 
In a letter to Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura, on March 2, 1999, Marge 
Anderson, Chief Executive of the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, as-
serted that the concept and practice of tribal sovereignty did not begin with nor 
did it gain its authority from within the history and boundaries of American 
governance: 
Please understand that sovereignty is not a gift from the federal gov-
ernment, and it is not a gift from the state of Minnesota. Sovereignty is 
the inherent right of every American Indian tribal government. It is a 
reflection of the indisputable fact that we lived on this land and gov-
erned ourselves hundreds of years before Europeans arrived.1 5 
Anderson's views are representative of indigenous tribes in the U.S. context 
who continually tell American political leaders and citizens that their claims 
against indigenous sovereignty reflect a basic misunderstanding of the funda-
mental components of the historical relationship between American and indig-
enous societies. 
The claim to "inherent" sovereignty means that indigenous people, in their 
myriad communities, governed themselves before European contact. As Ander-
son stated, indigenous tribes and nations were not granted sovereignty by the 
conquering and settling European societies. Rather, sovereignty existed before-
hand and the present limited nature of tribal sovereignty was a result of a reduc-
tion, not an amplification, of sovereignty. The basic notion that tribal sover-
eignty is both inherent and limited, however, begs the question as to what it 
actually means within the U.S. political context. As recently as 1991, the U.S. 
Supreme Court asserted that tribes are 'domestic dependent nations,' which ex-
ercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories."1 6 The 
term "domestic dependent nations" draws directly from the early nineteenth-
century decisions of John Marshall's Supreme Court, which confirmed the legal 
fact of tribal sovereignty while also defining its limitations within the American 
governing framework. 1 7 
The notion of "inherent but limited" sovereignty for "domestic dependent 
nations" further underscores the ambiguity of tribal sovereignty. The idea that 
tribal governments could enjoy some but not other components of sovereignty— 
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that they could be "limited sovereigns"—has been referred to by Ward Churchill, 
drawing from the words of Russell Means, as the "judicial equivalent. . . [of 
being] partly pregnant."1 8 Specifically, Churchill refers to how "American ju-
rists and policymakers alike argue that indigenous nations were always sover-
eign enough to validate U.S. territorial ambitions through treaties of cession, 
never sovereign enough to decline them." 1 9 Churchill asserts that indigenous 
people need to demand "complete decolonization" of indigenous lands by occu-
pying states, according to the terms of the United Nation's Charter and declara-
tion regarding the independence of colonized peoples. Ultimately, however, he 
is well aware that complete decolonization by the U.S. from all lands claimed by 
indigenous tribes is, to say the least, a stretch. Thus, in a footnote after calling 
for decolonization under U.N. rules, he offers that: 
a colonized people is not legally required to opt for complete indepen-
dence in order to exercise its complete independence and separation 
from its colonizer in exercising its right to self-determination. Instead, 
it may elect to limit its own sovereignty to some extent Colonizing 
states, however, are legally required to acknowledge without qualifica-
tion the right of colonial subjects to complete independence and sepa-
ration. . . . 2 0 
This qualification to the strong demand for "complete decolonization" is un-
doubtedly driven by Churchill's political realism. Yet, his words point to the 
conundrum of indigenous people's political life. 
This radical voice in indigenous politics is compelled to concede that for 
achieving sovereignty for indigenous nations, the "exercise of complete inde-
pendence" need not mean the actual manifestation of complete independence. 
Rather, an acknowledgment by the colonizing state of the right of indigenous 
peoples to complete independence is sufficient, and will then allow indigenous 
nations to agree to some limits on the very sovereignty they just won. After 
centuries of genocide, oppression and appropriation at the hands of an untrust-
worthy American nation, it would seem a little surprising for Churchill to accept 
U.S. "recognition" as a sufficient basis for indigenous sovereignty. Churchill, of 
course, is not so trusting, but rather is dealing with the dilemma of political 
claim-making amidst the immense cultural, political and demographic presence 
of the American nation. 
Like Marge Anderson, Churchill faces the problem of trying to defy the 
hegemony and seeming naturalness of American sovereignty over this land. They 
both do so by invoking indigenous sovereignty not just as a preexistent histori-
cal claim, but as a claim that refuses the presumption that tribal sovereignty was 
born from an all-encompassing American national sovereign, as if it were a 
"gift." In this sense, Anderson temporally locates tribal sovereignty outside 
American history so as to highlight its unique spatial location as not seamlessly 
within American political boundaries. Similarly, Churchill's demand for the rec-
Indigenous Nations Studies Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 2000 79 
ognition if not the manifestation of "complete independence" refuses the pre-
sumption of the legitimacy of American sovereignty by looking beyond Ameri-
can political and legal norms to draw upon those of the international commu-
nity. Just as Anderson looks beyond American political time to find a historical 
foundation for tribal sovereignty claims within the U.S., Churchill looks beyond 
American political space to find the legal foundation for the same political pur-
pose. The arguments of Anderson and Churchill indicate one way in which a 
politics on the boundaries shapes discourse, in that it compels indigenous politi-
cal actors to look outside the boundaries of American sovereignty to locate the 
historical, legal, and political case for tribal sovereignty. This reaching outside, 
however, is done to empower indigenous sovereignty in the American political 
context, where tribes make political claims for the rights and resources neces-
sary to secure the well-being of their people. That making the case for tribal 
sovereignty involves re-defining and challenging the temporal and spatial mean-
ing of the boundaries of the American polity is also evident in how American 
political identity seeks to define the location of indigenous political identity. 
America Shapes and Defends its Boundaries 
Consider the conflict in upstate New York, where the Oneida Nation uti-
lized profits from its Turning Stone Casino to buy some 10,500 acres in Oneida 
and Madison Counties. Backed by the U.S. Justice Department, the Oneida Na-
tion sued both counties for approximately 250,000 acres. The Oneida assert that 
these areas are their legally held historical lands based upon an eighteenth-cen-
tury treaty, 2 1 which the New York state government defied so often that it left the 
Oneida with just 32 acres of land prior to their recent economic revitalization. 
Oneida representatives have asserted that they do not want to evict the property 
holders of the county, but seek "a creative solution" to the violations of the U.S.-
Oneida treaty. 2 2 To the Oneida, their treaty with the U.S. in 1794 is an agreement 
between two sovereign governments, which a sub-national government such as 
New York state cannot undermine. The response from New York officials and 
citizens indicates that they also view the Oneida as a sovereign entity. However, 
in the view of these New Yorkers, the Oneida Nation is not one whose treaty 
relations with the U.S. deserve respect, but rather, they are an emerging and 
invading sovereign presence that threatens to undermine American sovereignty.23 
Oneida County executive Ralph Eannes put it bluntly: "if they buy back 
250,000 acres, they rip the community of central New York apart. If this guy 
pays taxes but that guy doesn't, this guy lives by zoning laws, that guy doesn't— 
what does that do to the community?" 2 4 One property owner in Vernon, New 
York expressed concern that the Oneida "want their own country within our 
country." The lawyer for the property owners referred to the Oneida Nation as 
having "quasi-sovereigntythat its claims against American private property 
"violates principles of the American Constitution," and said it was "shocking to 
see a government of this sort within our government." 2 5 These American politi-
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cal voices illustrate the perplexity of the political status of indigenous sover-
eignty in that they, like Anderson and Churchill, see it as conceptually both 
inside and outside the historical, legal and political boundaries of the American 
polity. To indigenous political actors, this is the route to strengthening tribal 
sovereignty, but to some American political actors it is the path to permeating 
the boundaries and fabric of American sovereignty. These two sentiments are 
not incompatible, as the claims for indigenous sovereignty pivot back and forth 
across the temporal, institutional, and political boundaries of the U.S. in order to 
re-define a political location upon which tribal sovereignty can have the firmest 
foundation possible. This inside/outside movement, however, means that this 
location of indigenous political agency ends up right on those boundaries, call-
ing forth the fears of Americans about what the boundaries of their own nation's 
sovereignty actually signify. Such fears are not uniquely contemporary, but rather 
harken back to the American nation's earliest days. 
In Playing Indian, Philip J. Deloria argues that the founding and revitaliza-
tion of American national identity and political culture occurred through indig-
enous culture in two distinct, historically-situated forms. 2 6 During the founding 
era on up through the nineteenth century, indigenous identity was a symbol of 
both rebellion and rooted independence, which helped shape the early form of 
American political identity. The figure of the Indian "situated within American 
societal boundaries" represented the rebellious and independent qualities ap-
propriated by Americans. This Indian imagery was framed in a noble/savage 
doubling, with a companion image outside these boundaries in the form of the 
"aggressive, exterior Indian Others who justified the violent acquisition of In-
dian land."2 7 Then, with the dawn of the twentieth century and the rapid influ-
ence of modernity taking hold in the U.S., indigenous identity provided Ameri-
cans a means of maintaining authenticity as a people of this land. As socio-
economic transformations brought the pressures of industrialization and urban-
ization to Americans, they drew sustenance from the "noble" figure of the In-
dian now outside the boundaries, representing "authenticity and natural purity " 2 8 
The other half of this image is the "savage" figure inside the boundaries, "coded 
as drinking, tramping, and laziness, Americanized Indians were powerful ex-
amples of the corrosive evil of modern society."2 9 This split image is not an 
insight into indigenous political life, but rather into the political life of America. 
America was created and perpetuated upon "such dissonances" as the "con-
stant collisions between personal liberty and social order," the "distance be-
tween the rhetoric of egalitarianism and the reality of slavery and class struggle," 
and the inherent paradoxes faced by "most nations and societies" that profess 
liberal-democratic norms yet strictly define the people for whom these norms 
are to have real meaning. "Playing Indian offered a powerful tool for holding 
such contradictions in abeyance," according to Philip Deloria. 3 0 This pretence 
helped to cohere the American national community through starkly illustrating 
the difference between the inside versus the outside of the nation. As a New York 
Times article in 1997 stated: "[Indigenous people] have been symbols and back-
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drops on which America projected its values and prejudices." 3 1 Given the role of 
indigenous political identity in the formation and maintenance of America's 
cultural and political boundaries, indigenous politics that actively question and 
blur these boundaries stand as a threat to America's coherence. 
Indigenous Politics on the Boundaries: Keeping Identity Whole 
The depth and ambiguity of the historical, cultural and political relations 
between American and indigenous societies leads Deloria to suggest that "while 
Indian people have lived out a collection of historical nightmares in the material 
world, they have also haunted a long night of American dreams." 3 2 This "haunt-
ing" is most palpable when indigenous political voices assert the fullness of 
their collective identities in defiance of the spatial and temporal presumptions of 
American political boundaries. In expressing the coherent shape and meaning 
of indigenous political history, identity and claims, indigenous political voices 
refuse the American effort to split their identities into two stereotypical images. 
This indigenous challenge to the coherence of American political identity is 
thus also a refusal of the "abeyance" of contradictions preserving America's 
unity and boundaries. 
In 1933 Chief Luther Standing Bear of the Oglala Sioux called into ques-
tion the status of American political identity in and over this land: 
The white man does not understand the Indian for the reason that he 
does not understand America. He is too far removed from its formative 
processes. The roots of the tree of his life have not yet grasped the rock 
and soi l . . . The man from Europe is still a foreigner and an alien. And 
he still hates the man who questioned his path across the continent.3 3 
Here the "contradictions" of political life in the United States are framed as 
preventing the American nation from gaining a sense of true belonging in North 
America. In contrast, indigenous people, though tormented for centuries, can 
call forth an historical coherence that positions them as the inassimilable pres-
ence refusing to legitimize American political authority over North American 
space. Through the imagery of Americans as "foreigners" in this land, Standing 
Bear defies the notion that American boundaries mark out the political commu-
nity to which indigenous people must assimilate or from which they must exit. 
The lesson here is that in generating political claims, indigenous people need 
not adhere to the options set out by the American political framework. In fact, 
they must recast these options in order to maintain the political link between 
their identity and claims to sovereignty in defiance of the presumption of Ameri-
can sovereignty. 
A striking example of the effort to upset the presumptions of American 
sovereignty in the course of redefining the politics of indigenous sovereignty 
came in November, 1969, when a group called Indians of All Tribes (IAT) seize 
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the abandoned federal penitentiary and surrounding land of Alcatraz Island in 
San Francisco Bay. 3 4 Asserting that "we didn't want to melt into the melting pot. 
. . . we wanted to remain Indians," the occupiers laid claim to the island to force 
negotiations with the federal government and to assure that Americans will not 
"forget us, the way they always have, but we will not be forgotten."3 5 The occu-
pation, which lasted until June 1971, claimed the land for the stated purpose of 
setting up such institutions as a Native American Studies program, Spiritual 
Center, Museum, and Center of Ecology. Prior to asserting these very specific 
demands, the Proclamation announcing the occupation creatively and humor-
ously inverted the discourse of European conquest. As with Standing Bear, I AT 
refused the coherence of the claim of American political identity over space. 
The "Proclamation: To the Great White Father and All His People," began 
with "we, the native Americans, re-claim the land known as Alcatraz Island in 
the name of all American Indians by right of discovery." With the precedent of 
the Manhattan Island sale, IAT offered to "purchase said Alcatraz Island for 24 
dollars." Echoing the discourse of American colonization, they offered to "give 
the inhabitants of this land a portion of the land for their own, to be held in trust 
by the American Indian gove rnmen t . . . to be administered by the Bureau of 
Caucasian Affairs." The imagery of indigenous conquest over idle U.S. territory 
refuses to forget the history and meaning of American political boundaries by 
turning the language of nation formation through conquest back against America. 
In this way, IAT discursively positioned themselves as a "foreign" colonizing 
force competing with the American nation over the marking of inter-national 
boundaries. This external challenge to the reach of America's boundaries is 
supplemented with an internal refusal of the elision of contradictions preserving 
the myth that American boundaries mark out a liberal-democratic space. 
Turning the history of American paternalism into a positive argument for 
their claim to Alcatraz, the Proclamation asserts that the island was "more than 
suitable as an Indian reservation, by the white man's own standards." Alcatraz 
Island "resembles most Indian reservations" in that, to name but a few of the 
comparisons, "it is isolated from modern facilities," "it has no fresh running 
water," "there are no oil or mineral rights," "the soil is rocky and unproductive 
and the land does not support game," "there are no educational facilities" and 
"the population has always been held as prisoners and kept dependent upon 
others."3 6 The occupation of Alcatraz and the claims set out in the Proclamation 
represent a politics on the boundaries that simultaneously calls forth the Ameri-
can government's treatment of indigenous tribes within its boundaries while 
also posing a nation-to-nation challenge to U.S. sovereignty in general. The 
objective of this inside/outside strategy, which was similarly pursued by other 
Red Power movements of this time, was to achieve "change and inclusion in 
U.S. institutions while preferring to retain Indian cultural identity. This was a 
form of nonassimilative inclusion."3 7 "Nonassimilative inclusion" is similar to 
the inside/outside location "on the boundaries'—the third space of sovereignty— 
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that many and varied indigenous political actors assert. A fitting contemporary 
example of this form of "boundary" politics is found in the tribal casino issue. 
Tribal Casino Gaming: A Post-Colonial Challenge 
Through the 1990s, only a few years after the passage of the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA), 3 8 tribal gaming enterprises earned yearly revenues that 
skyrocketed from $1.5- $2.5 billion in the early part of the decade to over $7 
billion in 1999. 3 9 Indigenous enterprises certainly do not dominate the gaming 
industry (accounting for under 15 percent of market share), but the substantial 
sum of money earned and the incredible potential for enhancing future revenues 
indicates why many tribes see gaming as a path toward economic self-suffi-
ciency. 4 0 However, tribal casino gaming is not simply an economic issue. It is a 
post-colonial political challenge that could threaten or strengthen indigenous 
sovereignty. 
This challenge is post-colonial because it reflects the ambivalent outcomes 
of the co-constitutive relationship between the colonized and the colonizer, in 
which colonial domination produces and is confronted by what Bhabha calls 
subaltern mimicry that "resembl[es] and menacefs]" the economic, legal, and 
political forms of the colonizer. 4 1 Given the potential of casino profits to address 
the material needs of a people at the bottom of most socio-economic rankings, 4 2 
a tribe faces the challenge of determining whether "mimicking" the colonizer's 
gaming economy strengthens tribal sovereignty or leads to the development of 
economic, social and political practices that too closely "resemble" those of the 
United States. By contrast, American communities, like upstate New York, face 
politically empowered casino tribes that palpably question the boundaries and 
meaning of U.S. sovereignty. Thus, by exposing America's ambivalence over 
the terms of national community, tribal casino gaming can be an expression of 
indigenous sovereignty that "menaces" the colonizer. In truth, tribal "mimicry" 
of the casino economy is neither simply "resemblance" nor "menace," but a 
tenuous reflection of both groups. 
Tribal gaming politics, then, are a post-colonial conflict in which an emer-
gent colonized people, as diverse collectivities, present to the colonizer a politi-
cal voice that is both an enunciation of unique sovereignty and a reflection of 
colonial forms. The paradoxes inherent to this indigenous political expression 
reveal it to be a potential third space of sovereignty, in which the tribal casino 
economy, at once, emerges from and challenges U.S. political and legal jurisdic-
tion. This point returns us back to David Wilkins' question. Only now, his ques-
tion can be reformulated in post-colonial terms around the present issue: Will 
entering the casino economy diminish a tribe's sovereignty by locating it further 
within - "resembling"—American political boundaries or strengthen this sover-
eignty - "menacingly"—outside these boundaries? While the responses to this 
question are as diverse as the tribes themselves, the California tribes who en-
gaged in the most expensive and notable indigenous-generated political argu-
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merit of recent times, within what Wilkins might call the "non-Indian politics" 
of the American electoral system, provided an intriguing answer. 
The California Referendum: Is this Indigenous Politics? 
In the 1990s many tribal gaming operations in California were very suc-
cessful.4 3 However, this success occurred without any of the over forty gaming 
tribes and the California state government agreeing to the "tribal-state compact" 
seemingly required by the provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 4 4 To 
the tribes, the lack of compacts was in great part a result of California Governor 
Pete Wilson's unwillingness to negotiate in "good faith." 4 5 On the other hand, 
the Governor claimed that he would not negotiate with tribes until they ceased 
operating casinos he deemed illegal according to the state's constitution.4 6 Rather 
than find a way to negotiate with the gaming tribes, Governor Wilson agreed to 
a compact with the non-gaming Pala Band in March, 1998. 
In tension with IGRA's regulation that a tribe and a state can only negotiate 
for themselves, the "Pala-Wilson" compact set out, among other things, limits 
on the number of video gaming terminals permitted in the state generally and 
within each tribal casino. 4 7 Thus, by its very provisions, this compact was to 
serve as the model for ail California tribes, if their casinos were to be considered 
legal by the state. In this way, Wilson sought to put a ceiling on the economic 
potential and also the political power of these tribes, which was thus an effort to 
control the scope of tribal sovereignty in the California context. 
John Ramos of the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians regarded the 
Governor's model compact and his general approach to the gaming tribes as an 
insult to both indigenous political identity and the values of American democ-
racy. To Ramos, the Pala-Wilson compact was "a clever strategy to destroy In-
dian gaming in California. It does not, however, serve well the people of Cali-
fornia and the rights of Native American tribes as recognized by the concept of 
Indian sovereignty." Seemingly, the destruction of Indian gaming would occur 
because of proposed state limits on the profit-maximizing potential of individual 
tribes, thus hampering the development of casinos that could employ and enter-
tain many Californians.4 8 The political threat was that the compact negotiated by 
Wilson and the Pala Band erased each tribe's right to its particular expression of 
sovereignty on this matter. Furthermore, Ramos argued, Wilson's "adamant 
refus[al] to talk to gaming tribes on the grounds that their games are illegal" was 
a blatant disregard for the principle that civil dialogue is the way to "settle con-
flicting claims" in American politics: 
Talk is the American way, especially when there is an honest difference 
of opinion. The logic behind [Wilson's plan] leads to an inescapable 
conclusion, namely, settling this dispute by force or compulsion—and 
that's just what the Governor wants to do. 4 9 
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Ramos articulated a politics on the boundaries formulation that casts the tribes 
as, at once, seeking the American dream in the "American way." At the same 
time, they sought a stronger foundation for tribal sovereignty in a way that calls 
forth the "inescapable" issue of competing claims to sovereignty. This seem-
ingly irresolvable and untranslatable paradox between seeking both the Ameri-
can dream and indigenous sovereignty was actually key to the power and flex-
ibility of the boundary politics employed here. 
In this case, a politics on the boundaries approach allows the tribes to go 
after the California state administration for both "not serving well the people" 
within the American political process and not adequately respecting the "con-
cept of Indian sovereignty" outside the American polity. In due course, the tribes 
defied the state's sovereignty by refusing to abide by and negotiate an agree-
ment based upon the Pala model. They then sought to reverse the state's sover-
eign expression by offering their own model, Proposition 5, calling it "The In-
dian Self-Reliance Initiative" that, among other things, "amends California law" 
to legalize tribal gaming operations and "mandates" that the Governor "sign [a] 
compact upon request by tribe." 5 0 By proposing this initiative to the state's citi-
zens for a referendum, these tribes looked to work within the American political 
system—the "American way" of electoral politics—in order to do to the state 
administration what the tribes thought the state administration was trying to do 
to them - "settle a dispute by force or compulsion." Compulsion, in this case, 
meant finding the avenue within state law to "force" the Governor to agree to 
compact terms defined by the tribes, thereby codifying the primacy of indig-
enous sovereignty over California state sovereignty on this issue. 
The tribes' effort to persuade the public to vote Yes on 5 5 1 called forth the 
internal discourse of American political culture while also, and often in the name 
of, addressing the need to strengthen tribal sovereignty's independence from 
American political institutions. For example, San Manuel Vice-Chairman Ken 
Ramirez, who was also Chairman of the Yes on 5 committee, penned "A Letter 
on Sovereignty," in which he argued that with their "ever-increasing involve-
ment in the larger American community as a result of Indian gaming" tribes find 
their sovereignty under greater attack and must respond with a vigorous defense 
of this fundamental indigenous political claim. Otherwise, tribes will be ab-
sorbed wholly within the American political system and be reduced to "just one 
of a multitude of interest groups fighting for their share of the pie." Such an 
outcome would doom the tribes, because "without sovereignty, Native Ameri-
cans are too few and too feeble by comparison to other interest groups to com-
pete effectively, as for example, against the vast wealth of Las Vegas casinos." 
Here, then, Ramirez gives credence to Wilkins' concern. Ramirez' solution, how-
ever, is not to abandon the realm of so-called "non-Indian politics," but rather to 
embolden the tribes' indispensable sovereignty through a nuanced yet direct 
engagement with an American polity in which indigenous people, in their own 
way, rightfully and historically claim a location. By their very articulation of 
this unique indigenous location, these tribes upset the notion that there is such * 
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thing as a seamless realm of "non-Indian politics," though they must still heed 
Wilkins' concerns by maintaining rather than defusing the "on the boundaries" 
position of "indigenous politics." The argument here is that this is a necessary 
yet difficult position to maintain, as Ramirez's argument indicates. 
While at one point, echoing Means via Churchill, Ramirez states "sover-
eignty is like pregnancy. . . you cannot be a little bit sovereign," he also implic-
itly grants such "partial pregnancy": "Native Americans believe that their tribes 
have the status of sovereign nations within the larger American nation." The 
balance Ramirez seeks here is to frame tribes as more than "just interest groups" 
within the American polity but still less than "fully sovereign nations" outside 
the American nation. The ambivalent relationship between tribal sovereignty 
and American politics is evident in the closing paragraph of Ramirez's letter, in 
which he calls forth: 
the lesson of history for both Native Americans and the American people 
going back to the Revolution of 1776. . . . Sovereignty is not a nine-
teenth- century concept—it is as vital and necessary today as when the 
Declaration of Independence proclaimed the right of all people to self-
government.5 2 
Citing the American Revolution and Declaration of Independence—a document 
declaring U.S. independence from the "King of Great Britain" because he, among 
other things, "rais[ed] the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands" (i.e., in-
digenous territory) and "endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontier, 
the merciless Indian Savages"—is boundary politics expressing the paradoxi-
cal, post-colonial relationship between indigenous and American political soci-
eties. 
Drawing from two of the most renowned signifiers of American political 
culture to advance the cause of tribal sovereignty ominously reflects Frantz 
Fanon's warning that "the settler's world is a hostile world, which spurns the 
native, but at the same time it is a world of which he is envious." Writing from 
his context of decolonizing Africa in the 1960s, Fanon sees: 
that the native never ceases to dream of putting himself in the place of 
the settler— not of becoming the settler but of substituting himself for 
the settler. This hostile world . . . represents not merely a hell from 
which the swiftest flight possible is desired, but also a paradise close at 
hand which is guarded by terrible watchdogs. 5 3 
The "hell" versus "paradise" option is similar to but not exactly the same as the 
inside versus outside locations defining the boundary politics of indigenous 
people. 
The sentiment and dilemma Fanon outlines is roughly similar for colonized 
peoples, whether the colonizing population, culture and institutions are located 
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across the "blue water," or if the colonizer's population, culture and institutions 
are settled on and over the colonized, like settler societies such as the U.S. One 
key difference in the settler society context from that analyzed by Fanon, how-
ever, is that while the "desire" to escape from the boundaries of colonial rule is 
similarly articulated by the claim that colonized peoples "cannot be a little bit 
sovereign," the "paradise close at hand" assumes the form of "becoming" rather 
than "substituting" the settler. In other words, where in Fanon's terms the "para-
dise close at hand" translates into some version of overthrowing the colonizer 
and taking control of its institutions, in the settler society this "paradise" trans-
lates into some version of assimilating to the colonizing polity and exercising 
political power within those institutions. This so-called assimilation, however, 
also articulates a post-colonial mimicry that appropriates, refigures and seeks to 
"menace" with classic American signifiers by rearticulating them for indigenous 
political purposes. 
Thus, Ramirez constructs a narrative of identification between indigenous 
people and the founding act and document of the United States. He drops the 
word "American" from the "Revolution of 1776" and frames the Declaration as 
if it were a United Nations declaration written for all peoples, rather than a 
specific group of British colonials in the eighteenth-century. This formulation is 
relevant to the very concrete casino gaming politics of California, because it 
suggests the way indigenous political actors frame the argument for a type of 
tribal location within American political boundaries based upon adherence to 
rather than a surrender of "the right of all people to self-government." Identify-
ing with the founding premises of American self-governance as a premise of 
tribal self-governance is in one way like the Yes on 5 argument, simultaneously 
trumpeting the sounds of assimilation and independence. Balancing both dis-
cursive angles was necessary to generate a political claim hinged on a notion of 
"self-reliance" that could resonate with the California public as a classic Ameri-
can aspiration, while also holding to the indigenous aim of collective self-deter-
mination. In substantiating the case for the "Self-Reliance" initiative, Yes on 5 
linked American notions of self-reliance to the location of indigenous tribes in 
the American political context. 
Press releases from Yes on 5 in the campaign's final weeks warned that the 
proposition's defeat "would be economically devastating for many Tribes 
throughout the state and destroy the progress they have made in reducing wel-
fare and achieving economic self-reliance."5 4 Instead of pitting tribal sovereignty 
directly against California's state sovereignty, the Yes on 5 campaign spoke of 
"giving Native Americans a hope for the American dream." 5 5 In articulating what 
the "Native American-American dream" meant for tribes and Califomians gen-
erally, Yes on 5 called forth the history of American aggression toward indig-
enous people and the contemporary aggression against California sovereignty 
as presented by Nevada casino interests that primarily funded the No on 5 cam-
paign. 5 6 In this effort, the Yes on 5 literature recalled, "Many times in the past, 
the federal and state government used their power to take away lands, resources 
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and rights and even the lives of California Indians." The contemporary effort of 
the California Governor and Nevada casinos to place limits on tribal gaming is 
thus presented here as the "latest shameful assault on California Indians."5 7 Cam-
paign material addressing the "facts" of the Proposition asserts that "the Califor-
nia Indian Self-Reliance Initiative will stop this new assault on California Indian 
Tribes and our state." 5 8 These final words offer a key insight into how the tribes 
positioned themselves on the boundaries in this political contest. 
First of all, referring to American-indigenous political history sets out how 
tribes have been oppressed, exploited and attacked as outsiders to the American 
nation. Thus, from one perspective, the effort of forces from various parts of the 
U.S. to curtail tribal gaming is another example of Americans seeking to crush 
tribal sovereignty. Secondly, and necessarily, the claim of "outsider" status vis a 
vis the American polity is crucially twinned with the claim that the tribes are 
insiders of a California state confronted with outsiders—Nevada casino inter-
ests— seeking to dictate California's legal and political future. One indigenous 
observer of the debate, David Alvarez, director of the Yacqui Indian center, con-
nected tribal political priorities with ostensibly American principles: "Proposi-
tion 5 is about self-reliance, sovereignty, privilege, a constitutional right, the 
freedom to debate and negotiate. When outsiders control gambling, they have 
control over our lives." 5 9 Yes on 5 framed its argument in a way that was often 
ambiguous about who in this conflict stood as the threatening "outsiders" (Is it 
all non-tribal Californians? All non-indigenous Americans? Nevada gaming in-
terests?) and by correlation who represented the threatened "our lives" (Is it all 
Native Americans? California casino tribes? The state and population of Cali-
fornia?). How one read the second sentence of Alvarez's statement would deter-
mine one's sense of whose "sovereignty," "constitutional rights" and "freedoms" 
were at stake in the Proposition 5 debate. 
The hope of the Yes on 5 supporters was that the citizens would see the 
referendum as important for indigenous people and Californians, not simply 
one or the other. That 63 percent of California voters said "Yes" on Proposition 
5 indicated that this argument resonated. Through their victory in this referen-
dum the proponents of Proposition 5 employed a politics on the boundaries 
argument to both articulate and strengthen their third space of sovereignty. In 
other words, the political practice of a politics on the boundaries involved draw-
ing on political and discursive resources both inside and outside the American 
polity. This practice furthered the pursuit of a third space of sovereignty, an 
expression of independence by which tribes determine what resources and rights 
within the American political system are necessary and obliged to them for the 
sake of securing greater autonomy from that system. Such tensions in this third 
space position are inherent and necessary to it, in that the very indefinability of 
the third space within the colonizer's political logic upsets or at least stalls the 
effort of the dominant nation to define tribal sovereignty for indigenous people. 
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Conclusion 
In general political science terms, the activity of casino tribes in the Ameri-
can electoral landscape might seem an example of an interest group expanding 
the horizons while demonstrating the value of American pluralism. By this logic, 
the tribes in California shaped and appealed to a larger constituency than them-
selves to generate the majority vote necessary to change state law. Relatedly, the 
referendum campaign could also be evidence of a powerful minority group within 
an American polity familiar with the politics of race and ethnicity. Through such 
a lens, this emergent minority group argued for meaningful inclusion by calling 
forth both the injustices of the past under American domination and the promise 
of the future within American liberal democracy. However, these "interest" and 
"minority" group approaches offer inadequate accounts, because they draw upon 
a logic that sees indigenous political activities and claims as reflecting the politi-
cal strategies, claims and objectives found within the American political frame-
work. As Ken Ramirez noted, an indigenous tribe is more than "just one of a 
multitude of interest groups." 
Indigenous political activities and claims re-articulate the experience and 
products of domination in a difficult but no less real effort to manifest, sustain 
and further the security of indigenous tribes as self-determining collectivities. 
The particular activities and claims of indigenous people are as diverse as the 
tribes themselves. Still, the myriad tribal choices that compose this diversity are 
best assessed through a logic of a politics on the boundaries as a practice and the 
third space of sovereignty as a pursuit. This logic seeks to account for how 
indigenous political agency and objectives have been affected but not elimi-
nated by persistent colonization. By seeing a boundary as neither an empty space 
nor a barrier, but rather in Bhabha's reading of Martin Heidegger, "the place 
from which something begins its presencing," 5 0 we find the active, ambiguous 
and yet persistent post-colonial location of indigenous people's politics. Through 
this discovery, a politics on the boundaries logic illustrates the coherence rather 
than the contradiction in the notion of indigenous tribes as simultaneously do-
mestic participants within the American polity and inter-national actors outside 
this polity. This coherent indigenous political articulation "resembles" and "men-
aces" American political boundaries, and through this domestic-inter-national 
"presence" indigenous politics can open up spaces for achieving political suc-
cess by drawing on and exposing the ambivalence inherent in American politi-
cal life. 
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